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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Chairman:	Mr. ELARABY	(Egypt)
later:	Mr. SUH (Vice-Chairman)	(Republic of Korea)
later:	Mr. ELARABY (Chairman)	(Egypt)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

Ms. MASON (Canada) (interpretation from French): I should like to offer you our warmest congratulations, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Canada and Egypt have a long and fruitful history of cooperation in multilateral forums. We look forward to strengthening that constructive relationship by offering any assistance you might require to ensure that we have an effective and productive session.

Canada joins other nations in welcoming the end of the cold war. The unprecedented levels of armaments build up in those times of East-West tensions were an intolerable burden to both sides, and indirectly to the world community at large. The arms race generated by the cold war was the central challenge to the cause of arms control and disarmament. It is testimony to the perseverance of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other multilateral arms-control bodies that so much was accomplished even when the political climate seemed so bleak.

We must realize, however, that the challenge today is to adapt our hard-earned successes in arms control and disarmament to the new threats to international security emerging in the aftermath of the cold war. It is for that reason that we welcome the general recognition that the work of this Committee must be firmly situated in the larger context of global security. Arms control is an instrument, not a goal in itself. During the cold war, the

(Ms. Mason, Canada)

goal was to contain and control East-West tensions. Now we must seek to understand the conditions necessary for global security and to use arms-control agreements to help build the foundation on which global security can be based.

On many occasions my Government has emphasized the need to promote democracy as a basis for harmonious relations between States. We welcome, therefore, the Secretary-General's statement that

> "There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order". (A/47/277, para. 59)

There is also an obvious connection between development and democracy. Nations and peoples must be able to enjoy a reasonable standard of living if democracy is to flourish. This is where arms control and disarmament find their place. If we can reach agreement on the global control of armaments and on measures for disarmament, then we improve prospects for regional and global stability and for true peace and security.

As we now address these large and complex questions, Canada welcomes the seminal guidance provided by the Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace". His emphasis on peace-building, for example, provides a broader context for the work of this Committee. His support for stronger links between the United Nations and regional organizations may also point the way for our future deliberations.

(Ms. Mason, Canada)

(spoke in English)

As the newest member of the Organization of American States (OAS), Canada has sought to share with its partners in the hemisphere its long experience in verification and the development of confidence- and security-building measures. The OAS now has a working group studying the application of such measures to regional security. Other regional organizations might also profit from the experience and successes of multilateral arms control.

Canada is actively seeking to promote peace through its participation in all five working groups established within the framework of the multilateral negotiations of the Middle East peace process. The efforts of the working group on arms control and regional security are especially important and relevant to the deliberations of this body. Discussions within the working group have focused on a wide range of confidence-building and arms-control measures with a view to building peace and stability in the region.

Canada, as one of the non-regional partners in the multilateral phase of the peace process, aims above all to support the efforts of the sponsors and all participants to move the overall peace process forward. Responsibility for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict rests with the parties involved in the direct bilateral negotiations. The multilateral negotiations are no substitute for those talks. However, the multilateral negotiations may offer an opportunity for the parties to acquire a vision of the tangible benefits to be gained from an eventual overall political settlement, a more hopeful vision of the future for the Middle East.

(Ms. Mason, Canada)

Canada, with its long-standing experience in peace-keeping and in other areas such as verification and aerial monitoring, and its developed relations with parties throughout the region, will continue to contribute to the efforts of all participants to build such a future.

As we extend our reach to encompass regional and global security, we should also be aware of new issues on the arms-control agenda. The dismantling of conventional arsenals and weapons of mass destruction requires the conversion of military production to civilian uses. That in itself is a Herculean task, but it will not be enough unless it is accompanied by the retraining and democratization of the personnel and military forces created to bear those weapons.

In company with other countries, Canada has begun to lend its technology and know-how to the task of conversion. We are also playing a leading role in the establishment of an international centre for science and technology in Kiev to employ nuclear scientists and engineers in civilian endeavours. But it will require a massive and concerted effort to achieve progress. It would be an irony indeed if the very success of arms control created a vast pool of human and technological resources which, unemployed and idle, became the catalyst for future conflict.

Since 1989 the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission have been placing increasing emphasis both on regional approaches to disarmament and on new and emerging issues on the post-cold-war agenda. Through its three regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament and its programme of conferences, such as the one co-hosted with the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs

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in August of this year, the Office of Disarmament Affairs has been actively promoting regional dialogue. Discussions have been facilitated on conflict prevention, non-proliferation in both its global and its regional dimensions, confidence building and transparency, safe storage and disposal of weapons, and conversion.

In our view, the United Nations has an important role to play in promoting informal mechanisms for dialogue, particularly in regions or subregions where institutional frameworks for such discussions are not yet fully developed. Canada commends these ongoing activities of the Office of Disarmament Affairs and pledges its continuing support for them.

Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky drew attention in this Committee to the concern repeatedly expressed earlier this autumn in the General Assembly over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Canada fully shares his view that

> "non-proliferation in all its aspects ... is becoming one of the most important subjects on the disarmament agenda, including as it does not only nuclear but all weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery and the dual-purpose technology that may be transferred for non-peaceful purposes". (A/C.1/47/PV.3, p. 11)

As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney emphasized in Canada's Non-Proliferation Programme of Action in May of this year, the problem requires sustained action on all fronts, from the strengthening and enforcement of global norms through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups down to the rigorous implementation of national export controls. Particularly important is the

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work under way in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime, work that deserves our fullest support, both political and financial. Simply put, the IAEA must be given the tools and the backing to get the job done.

Turning to the linchpin of the global nuclear-non-proliferation regime, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Canada echoes the satisfaction expressed by many other delegations on the positive developments of the past year. These include continuing cuts in the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals, several important new accessions to the Treaty and concrete steps to consolidate the regimes of military denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, in Africa and in Latin America.

But much remains to be done as we prepare for the launching of the NPT into the twenty-first century. Our Prime Minister has called for even deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States of America. He has urged Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to carry out their pledges to honour the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) and to sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. There is no rational reason for delaying this process. Any imagined advantage of using nuclear weapons as bargaining chips is far outweighed by the dangers. Adherence to these non-proliferation principles is fundamental to the process of expanding cooperation between Canada and these new States.

Canada believes that the NPT must be indefinitely extended in 1995 and that the goal of universal adherence must be relentlessly pursued. Recalling the basic bargain on horizontal and vertical non-proliferation implicit in the NPT, Prime Minister Mulroney has also urged that the 1995 extension conference

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confirm that relationship. To help pave the way, he called specifically in May for all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. Canada views the recent United States decision to join France and Russia in declaring a testing moratorium as a watershed in the long-standing international effort to achieve a total ban on such tests in all environments and for all time. We call on the United Kingdom and China to join them. Perhaps even more important is the United States commitment not to test at all after 1996 provided that other nuclear-weapon States refrain as well. We urge the other four to make a mutually reinforcing commitment to that end.

Prime Minister Mulroney also called for progress on the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. The proposal by President Bush in his General Assembly address that the Security Council take up this issue is most timely and important.

Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, wrote recently that the basis for global arms control and disarmament as foreseen by the architects of the United Nations Charter was to be a collective security system that would provide a sense of security and mutual confidence that would allow for arms limitation to take place. Since the demise of the cold war we have been learning just how hard it is to put that collective security system in place in a positive and enduring fashion. In Canada's view, a credible assurance by the Security Council to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT could be a significant step forward in creating the post-cold-war architecture of cooperative security.

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I should like to turn now to Canada's priorities in the First Committee this session.

With regard to chemical weapons, Canada echoes the views of all the delegations that have already spoken about the historical importance of the Convention on chemical weapons negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. It is the first multilateral disarmament agreement with effective verification provisions that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is comprehensive and calls for the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, retention or use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

It is global, and already, like Canada, a significant number of States from many geographic regions have indicated that they will support it and will be original signatories. Because it establishes new norms of verification and inspection far surpassing any previous multilateral arms-control and disarmament instrument, it is, in Canada's view, a pace-setting agreement.

For many years now Canada and Poland, working together in the United Nations, have introduced a draft resolution supporting the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the Convention on chemical weapons and urging its early completion. This year we are joined by Germany, which, under the most able and dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador von Wagner, guided the Conference on Disarmament Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to its successful conclusion.

As one of the 133 sponsors of this draft resolution - A/C.1/47/L.1 - we urge all Member States to endorse it and the Convention itself. Let us set

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the stage for the signing Conference in Paris in early 1993, and, as Ambassador Von Wagner said, let us seize this

"singular opporutunity to lay the foundation of a new cooperative concept of international security".

During this session of the First Committee we shall have before us a draft resolution that will begin the preparatory process for the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension conference. Without the NPT, there could be neither nuclear security nor peaceful nuclear trade. Canada pledges its full cooperation in bringing about a smooth launching of this vitally important process.

The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty has long been a fundamental arms-control objective of Canada. Nuclear-testing moratoriums are an important step towards this end, clearing the way for the negotiations themselves. Canada congratulates President Bush for signing into law a Bill that not only takes that step but also commits his Administration to submitting annually to Congress a plan for achieving, on or before 30 September 1996, a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

In our view, this law embodies a clear commitment by the United States to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty in good faith and within a reasonable time frame. Moreover, this commitment is reinforced by the fact that Congress will have the opportunity to review annually the plans of the Executive Branch on the achievement of a successful outcome to these negotiations.

In the light of these momentous developments, Canada hopes for even broader support for the draft resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty than was achieved last year, when two related draft resolutions were, for the first time, successfully merged.

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Canada will once again introduce its traditional draft resolution regarding prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices. We regard this as a timely call supporting global non-proliferation objectives. In the light of recent important developments regarding the disposition of fissionable material as a result of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the decision of the United States unilaterally to cease the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, we hope for even broader support for this draft resolution than was received in the past.

I should like to turn now to the question of verification. Delegations will recall that two years ago General Assembly resolution 45/65 of 4 December 1990 welcomed the fact that the Secretary-General's report had been approved by the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification. That consensus resolution encouraged Member States to give active consideration to the recommendations in the Group of Experts Study and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation, where appropriate. It also called on the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on actions to implement these recommendations.

During the last decade Canada has played a particularly active role in United Nations consideration of the issue of "verification in all its aspects", including the study conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts. Following this, Canada, working closely with a number of other Member States, including France and the Netherlands, and building upon the text of earlier consensus resolutions on verification, will submit a draft resolution at this General Assembly session. The draft resolution will take note of the

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Secretary-General's report on implementing the recommendations of the Group of Experts Study and will reiterate the call for the assistance of Member States in its implementation. As I have said before in this Committee, the usefulness of United Nations activities with respect to the recommendations of the Group of Experts Study will be determined in large measure by the assistance provided by Member States.

The draft resolution will go beyond this, however. Since the study of the 1990 Group of Governmental Experts there have been major developments in the international system that indicate a renewed interest in and commitment to multilateral institutions addressing security questions. Such developments, including the recent experience of the United Nations and the increasing reliance of the world community on United Nations peace-keeping activities, provide important opportunities for the consideration of a useful United Nations role in verification.

To explore these new opportunities the draft resolution introduces language calling for a follow-up Group of Governmental Experts study focusing on two topics - the preliminary practical lessons from the recent United Nations experience and other international developments relating to verification; and how the verification of arms-limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.

Canada is convinced that verification remains as relevant today as it was at any time in the past. Verification is not an East-West issue that has died with the cold war. In resolution 43/81 B of 7 December 1988, endorsed unanimously, the view is expressed that adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms-limitation and disarmament agreements.

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Moreover, verification must be seen as more than simply a matter of substituting concrete evidence for blind trust or of providing some sort of "police" function for arms-control and disarmament agreements. Rather, verification is one dimension of a common institution-building process. It should help meet the need to institutionalize, in the context of relations among States, the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations that govern the conduct of relations among individuals in all civilized societies.

Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent, but they allow for such possibilities and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations can be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and resolved, and non-compliance objectively established. Viewed in this light, an exploration of the role that verification activities can play in relation to the ideas advanced by the Secretary-General in his report "An Agenda for Peace" should prove very timely.

With regard to transparency in armaments, as a country that participated in the Secretary-General's panel of governmental experts, Canada welcomes his report on the question of a United Nations arms register. I am especially pleased that the report reflects consensus among a wide geographic range of countries. In that aspect the report is one further indication that the global community is dedicated to promoting transparency in armaments and to tackling in a practical way the problem of excessive and destablilizing arms build-ups. We hope that all 17 panel countries will sponsor the current draft resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's report. We must now work for universal participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Canada will report fully to the Register by 30 April 1993 for the calendar year 1992. We call on all Member States to do likewise.

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The panel agreed on definitions of categories of equipment in respect of which transfers are to be registered. It also developed a user-friendly standardized form for reporting international transfers. Most important, the panel focused on the question of the modalities for early expansion of the Register. In that context, the panel noted that the possibility of the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production will follow the examination of those issues by the group of governmental experts to be convened in 1994. In Canada's view, the inclusion in 1994 of military holdings and procurement through national production is essential to making the Register a meaningful instrument of transparency in armaments. In the interim period we encourage all Member States to contribute fully to the Register and, as requested in paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 46/36 L, to prepare their views on the operation of the Register during its first two years and on the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production.

Canada pledges its cooperation with respect to the draft resolution to be introduced by Australia in its capacity as President of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The environmental aggression by Iraq during the Gulf War catapulted this hitherto obscure treaty onto centre-stage. The Review Conference, held at Geneva in September, provided an opportunity to put in place a process for adapting the Convention to contemporary relevance.

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In Canada's view, the Review Conference made it plain that all was not well with the ENMOD Treaty, largely because of serious differences of interpretation of the scope of the Treaty among States parties. The Final Declaration made a modest step towards clarifying those differences. Most notably, it was agreed that any and all environmental-modification techniques are covered, regardless of the level of technology employed. Further, it was agreed that the use of herbicides is covered by the Convention.

However, the review also made it clear in our view that there is no basis for affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Convention without a more careful examination by experts of the interpretational problems. Canada is therefore one of the countries referred to in paragraph 2 of the Final Declaration as desiring a consultative committee of experts to be convened pursuant to article V of the Treaty.

It is our hope that the First Committee will lend its support both to the draft resolution and to the efforts of many States parties to ensure that there is a timely follow-up of the Review Conference. Like Finland, Canada will consult with other interested States parties to that end. In our view, the environmental modification Convention must be liberated from its cold-war past and allowed to play a more meaningful role in curbing the obscenity of environmental warfare.

The cold war has left its mark not only in the immense quantity of weaponry that must now be dismantled, but in an equal weight of mind-sets and work habits which are the direct result of the First Committee's having been reduced for 40-odd years to a mainly declaratory rather than genuinely

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deliberative body. The sheer logistics of keeping track of the resolutions are such that genuine dialogue within groups, let alone among them, is stymied. The impediment this situation creates to truly meaningful progress in this body cannot in our view be overestimated.

Since 1988, in a process begun under Canadian chairmanship of the First Committee, low-key but fairly consistent efforts have been under way to improve the efficiency of this body by encouraging delegations to dispense with outdated draft resolutions, to merge related ones and to biennialize recurring issues. This process has had modest but steady results, as was so thoroughly demonstrated in the breakdown regarding the number and disposition of draft resolutions in the First Committee over the past few years provided by Ambassador Marín Bosch in his statement in the general debate.

Last year's experience with the draft resolution establishing the United Nations arms Register, in our view, directly contributed to the decreased number of draft resolutions. Delegations were engaged in an important negotiation involving a range of views that crossed traditional groupings and that had as its goal a concrete and important objective. In short, all of us were forced to set priorities, and the result was fewer draft resolutions and more dialogue. In our view, this is a trend that must continue if we are successfully to adapt this body to the new challenges on the multilateral arms-control agenda.

On the occasion of this general debate on disarmament and international security we have all alluded in one way or another to the basic contradiction that confronts us. On the one hand, the end of the cold war has opened the

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way to significant arms-control and disarmament measures. On the other, it has unleashed an avalanche of local and regional conflicts. The "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277) gives us both the broad framework for promoting global security and concrete recommendations with respect to many critical aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building. However, it does not deal at all with the role that arms control and disarmament per se can play in this overall process. Neither is this touched on by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's first annual report on the work of the Organization (A/47/1).

In Canada's view, the time has come for "An Agenda for Peace: Part Two", which would elaborate in more detail the contribution that the multilateral arms control and disarmament forums can make to building a new cooperative security framework. An essential aspect of this review would be the role of the Office for Disarmament Affairs as the focal point for a revitalized United Nations role in multilateral arms control and disarmament. We urge all members of this Committee to consider how they might contribute to that end.

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of unlimited time for reflection. As the demand for United Nations peace-keeping missions only too clearly shows - and as I speak the United Nations has over 40,000 men and women serving in 12 United Nations peace-keeping operations in Central America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and nearly 10,000 more are preparing to go to Bosnia, Somalia and Mozambique - the need for progress in creating a new framework of international security is in danger of completely outstripping our capacity to respond. Let us therefore ensure that the deliberations of this Committee reflect the need for prompt, concrete actions in our shared task of peace-building.

Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria): On behalf of the delegation of Bulgaria, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee.

We would like to express our sympathy and deep condolences in connection with the devastating earthquake that struck your country the other day.

My delegation is grateful to your predecessor, Mr. Robert Mroziewicz, now Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, for his able guidance of the proceedings of this Committee last year.

I would like to congratulate also the other Committee officers on their election: the Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Pasí Patokallio of Finland and Mr. Dae Won Suh of the Republic of Korea, and the Rapporteur, Mr. Jerzy Zaleski of Poland.

We welcome among us the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, whom we all know very well for his remarkable contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

My delegation would also like to mention with appreciation the preparatory work done by the Office for Disarmament Affairs headed by its Acting Director, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, as well as the important role played by the Secretary of the First Committee, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi.

The First Committee is meeting at a time of dramatic transformation which has substantially changed the global political landscape. The international environment now offers a better chance for further progress in arms control, which continues to be an integral part and one of the basic pillars of the efforts to maintain peace and security in the world.

Significant changes have occurred in military structures and postures in many parts of the world, most notably in Europe. Alliance strategies and defence doctrines have been changed and are under continuous review with a view to becoming fully adapted to the new security situation. Former members of opposing military alliances have become partners in their joint efforts to meet common security concerns and find acceptable solutions to problems of national and international security. Defence expenditures in a number of countries have been significantly reduced. Greater openness and transparency with respect to peacetime military activities have helped to increase predictability and build more confidence among States.

Recent progress in arms control and disarmament has contributed to a better and more secure world. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the concluding act of the negotiation on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna 1992 Document on confidence- and security-building measures provide the stable foundation on which to start building a new cooperative security framework in Europe. The entry into force of all these agreements will close a whole

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chapter in the history of arms control, when strategic and bloc considerations used to prevail in shaping the overall approach to stability and common security. Further negotiations should take into account the newly defined security interests of a number of States, reflecting the radical changes in the political environment, particularly in Eastern Europe.

We welcome the decision of the Helsinki summit meeting to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) forum for security cooperation. Its mandate provides for negotiation of arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures, as well as for consultation and cooperation on security-related matters and reduction of the risk of conflict. We hope that this forum will take significant steps to enhance stability and common security in Europe.

Regular meetings of West and East European partners within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Council of the Western European Union, have proved their value as forums for political consultations between States with similar security objectives and a common determination to build a free and united Europe. We have entered a long-term process where stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area will increasingly be built on a network of interlocking and reinforcing institutions, such as the CSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe. Other arrangements and forms of regional and subregional cooperation may have an important role to play within the new security structures of Europe.

Regional peace-keeping and peacemaking actions will increasingly require coordination with the United Nations instruments for maintaining peace and security. The Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277)

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provides a conceptual basis for development of a co-ordination mechanism that would enhance the role of the regional institutions and help to establish an important link between regional and global security.

With reference to the report "An Agenda for Peace", I wish also to note the valid point made today by the preceding speaker, the leader of the Canadian delegation, Ms. Peggy Mason, that the time has come for an "Agenda for Peace: Part Two", which will elaborate in more detail the contribution that the multilateral arms control and disarmament forums can play in building a new cooperative security framework. The delegation of Bulgaria endorses the view that an essential aspect of this review should be the role of the Office for Disarmament Affairs as the focal point for a revitalized United Nations role in multilateral arms control and disarmament.

This brings me to the role that arms control and disarmament play today in the new arms-control priorities in a drastically changed political environment.

Arms control and disarmament are not isolated from other efforts to maintain peace and strengthen stability in the world. Measures of arms control are now part and parcel of any far-reaching operation of the United Nations to keep peace, as provided for in the respective decisions of the Security Council.

Profound changes in the world have also led to a shift in disarmament priorities, giving way to a new generation of arms-control measures which more adequately reflect the needs of the present time. The proceedings of the First Committee last year clearly illustrate the scope of this important development. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, multilateral export controls, transparency and monitoring of arms transfers, and the

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prohibition of chemical weapons are now central to the efforts to meet widely shared security concerns.

The new emphasis on arms control and disarmament was acknowledged by the Security Council in its Summit statement in January. We join the call of the Security Council to all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and to restrain the accumulation and transfer of arms.

Historic transformations in strategic relations have brought about significant changes in long-standing concepts of peace and security. Arms control is no longer closely tied to narrow security perceptions and military doctrines of opposing military alliances. Key strategic factors which used to stimulate the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, seem to have disappeared. Non-military factors bearing on global and regional stability are acquiring greater significance in this process of the gradual adaptation of concepts and strategies to the new global realities.

We are pleased to note these positive developments, which raise our hopes for the building of a safer and more prosperous world, a world in which reliance on arms to safeguard national security would be further decreased and non-military factors of security would be accorded greater priority.

Bulgaria welcomes the agreement in principle reached in June by President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin, which is currently being translated into treaty language. When this new agreement is implemented after the completion of the START reductions, the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides would be cut to 3,000 and 3,500 warheads respectively. That would result in a decrease of more than 70 per cent to be effected in two phases by the year 2003. Of even more importance are the deep reductions envisaged for

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multiple-warhead missiles, which have in the past produced serious concerns with respect to strategic stability.

Rather than merely limiting long-range nuclear weapons, these bilateral agreements break new ground by drastically reducing their present levels. Given the reductions of ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles unilaterally announced by the United States and by the former Soviet Union, the nuclear-warhead cuts by both sides will be even greater. This positive development follows the removal of sea-based, non-strategic nuclear weapons, widely considered to be destabilizing in terms of their potential easily to initiate a major nuclear exchange.

To begin this process, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) - now being a five-party instrument, including the Protocol signed in Lisbon in May this year - should first be ratified by all States parties to it. We welcome the recent completion of this process by the United States and look forward to prompt action by all other States concerned. Implementation of the Lisbon Protocol would result in the first act ever whereby countries possessing nuclear weapons would renounce them altogether. The envisaged adherence of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States would, inter alia, formally recognize this historic event.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

The progress in nuclear disarmament is a significant contribution to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prior to the extension conference to be held in 1995. We hope that the duration of the Treaty, which is a cornerstone of arms control, will be extended indefinitely. My delegation believes that starting preparations for the 1995 conference in a timely manner should be one of the key tasks of the First Committee this year. The delegation of Bulgaria intends to set forth detailed views on issues related to non-proliferation and export controls in a separate statement later in the session.

Non-proliferation concerns have changed the political and strategic value of the highly controversial issue of developing anti-ballistic-missile defences. Projects to build such defences are no longer viewed exclusively in the context of a strategic nuclear equation, but also from the perspective of building a cooperative global protection system capable of intercepting limited missile attacks. We look forward to the results of the high-level discussions on the potential benefits of a global protection system announced earlier this year by the United States and the Russian Federation.

It is our hope that an arms race in outer space can be prevented. Bulgaria remains committed to this universally recognized objective and supports actions to build confidence, which would facilitate its attainment. We believe that France's idea of making it mandatory to provide advance notification of launches of ballistic missiles and rockets carrying satellites or other objects into space deserves serious consideration. My delegation looks forward to the contribution that the United Nations study on confidence-building measures in outer space could make in promoting progress in this area.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Current global changes have the potential to alter radically the traditional rationale of nuclear-weapon States for continuing the testing of nuclear weapons. The unilateral moratoriums on nuclear tests declared by France and the Russian Federation, and more recently by the United States, create conditions for arriving at an early nucleat-test-ban agreement. Such an agreement, whether containing numerical and yield limitations as a step towards a comprehensive ban or directly providing for such a ban, could strengthen the non-proliferation regime in good time for the 1995 NPT extension conference. We hope that progress will be made at the present session towards that end.

The acquisition of conventional weapons in a world that continues to suffer from regional tensions is an issue of increasing importance for the maintenance of peace, security and stability. There is a virtual consensus that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in areas of conflict, has to be prevented through a collective effort. Greater transparency in regional activities to build up conventional arsenals, as well as universal participation in the Register of Conventional Arms that has already been established, could help the United Nations monitor various ways of acquiring such weapons, including international arms transfers, military holdings, and procurement through national production.

The Government of Bulgaria welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. My country intends to submit for inclusion in the Register all the necessary data on arms transfers and other

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

available background information, in accordance with resolution 46/36 L. We hope that all other Member States will be equally willing to support the effective functioning of the Register by strictly following the provisions of that resolution.

Regional registers could also be useful instruments to promote transparency among neighbouring States, taking into account the specific characteristics of the regions in question. We look at such regional endeavours as a supplement rather than an alternative to the universal Register of Conventional Arms. The immediate task for us is to render the United Nations Register fully operational in 1993.

My delegation welcomes the submission by the panel of governmental technical experts of their consensus report (A/47/342) on the Register of Conventional Arms. We consider that document a valuable contribution to the implementation of resolution 46/36 L. The panel fulfilled its mandate by providing guidance to Member States on technical procedures for the operation of the Register. The report contains a standardized form to be used by States for the submission of national data on their respective exports and imports. The experts offered important clarifications as to the scope of arms transfers subject to registration and as to instances when Governments may apply their own criteria in determining exactly when a transfer should be reported. We welcome the attempt of the panel to suggest modalities for an early expansion of the scope of the United Nations Register in line with the provisions of resolution 46/36 L.

The delegation of Bulgaria is prepared to join in sponsoring a draft resolution under agenda item 61 (1) that would declare the determination of the General Assembly to ensure the effective operation of the Register of

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Conventional Arms, endorse the recommendations on the implementation and technical adjustment of the Register contained in the panel's report, and take note of the considerations advanced on the modalities for expansion of the Register's scope. My delegation also supports the inclusion in such a draft resolution of a provision stating that the Conference on Disarmament should continue its work on its agenda item on transparency in armaments.*

Banning chemical weapons has always been a major subject of goal-oriented discussions in the First Committee. The delegation of Bulgaria is glad that the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons have finally produced the expected result. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany, for successfully guiding the negotiations at their most decisive stage.

The completion of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, was a truly historic event. This is the first multilateral disarmament agreement with effective verification provisions outlawing an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. This comprehensive document represents a delicate balance among the security interests of many States. It establishes a balance between the need for credible verification and respect for national interests. It also takes care to safeguard economic and commercial interests. The provisions of the draft Convention ensure that the world chemical industry will not be subject to an unnecessarily intrusive or bureaucratic system of on-site inspections.

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* Mr. Suh (Republic of Korea), Vice Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

The chemical weapons Convention will make a significant contribution to international peace and security. It should therefore be considered on its own merits. Signing it should not be dependent on other equally important arms-control developments. We believe that the Convention will have an extremely positive effect on regional efforts to create zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

It is worth noting that parties to the chemical weapons Convention, subject to the constraints of its verification mechanism and fully complying with their obligations under it, should expect to benefit greatly from a preferential relaxation of the export-control measures generally applied by other States parties to prevent chemical-weapons proliferation.

The delegation of Bulgaria strongly believes that at its current session the Assembly will endorse the draft Convention by consensus. We are glad to note that draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1 already has 133 sponsors.

(Mr. Devanov, Bulgaria)

The entry into force of the Convention on chemical weapons will lead to the creation of a new international organization. Its activities will have an important stabilizing effect on global peace and security. We welcome the selection of The Hague as the seat of the future organization.

Bulgaria looks forward to taking part in the Paris Conference on signing the Convention on chemical weapons early next year. It is the intention of the Government of Bulgaria to become an original signatory to this Convention and to work for its early entry into force. As repeatedly stated at the highest political level, Bulgaria has no chemical weapons, either foreign or its own. I also wish to inform the Committee that my Government has already started the necessary preparation adequately to meet its future obligations under this Convention. We also intend to participate in the work of the preparatory commission, the functions of which are well defined in the report of the Conference on Disarmament.

The regional approach to arms control and disarmament remains very important, since it is capable of taking into due account the specific characteristics of each region and the interests of all parties involved. Regional or subregional measures may effectively contribute to strengthening the security of individual States, increasing stability in the respective regions, and promoting global disarmament. We agree that such measures should focus initially on the most destabilizing military capabilities with a view to strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces.

Bulgaria continues to stand behind the consensus on resolution 46/36 F dealing with regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures. In line with its provisions, my country has put forward for consideration various measures related to security in the Balkans, and looks ahead to advancing the dialogue on these and other regional endeavours.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria is glad to note the successful outcome of the recent Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. I also wish to mention with appreciation the first meeting of the experts on verification related to the Convention on biological weapons. We believe that the identification and examination of potential measures from a scientific and technical standpoint will ultimately result in supplementing this with an effective verification regime. We look forward to the next meeting of the governmental experts in November this year in Geneva.

Increased openness and transparency, although not a disarmament measure in itself, contributes to enhancing confidence among nations and makes the public aware of the dangers and waste of the arms race. We are glad to note that the United Nations Disarmament Commission agreed this year on guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, providing new elements of future confidence-building measures. My delegation will be ready to support a draft resolution that is based on these guidelines and recommendations.

In the post-cold-war era, the international community should be prepared to make further steps towards greater transparency, confidence and stability. For its part, Bulgaria will continue to make its contribution to this effect. The general tendency to reduce the role of military factors in international politics is liable to release resources needed for social, economic, and environmental development. For a number of countries, including my own, this means converting military production facilities to civil purposes. Bulgaria continues to be interested in the development of a substantive dialogue and exchange of experience on conversion, and looks forward to further strengthening its bilateral cooperation on this issue with other countries.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

The delegation of Bulgaria believes that the First Committee can play an even more effective role in arms control if the tendency to rationalize its work continues. We welcome the recent decision of this Committee to hold a combined general debate and a combined consideration of draft resolutions, covering both arms control and security-related items.

My delegation hopes that the submission of draft resolutions with highly controversial or biased language, drawing one-sided pictures of the current situation, will be avoided this year. We happen to believe that such a course of action could ensure further progress on a number of important agenda items, particularly when regional peace efforts related to the issues discussed are under way and it is widely felt that external interference could adversely affect the constructive atmosphere.

The First Committee has yet another opportunity to avail itself of the positive changes in the international environment in order to make further progress in its work. The Bulgarian delegation looks forward to cooperating closely with all other delegations in ensuring the success of the current session of the First Committee.

Mr. O'BRIEN (New Zealand): Congratulations to you, Sir, to Ambassador Elaraby, and the other members of the Bureau. The Committee is in the very best of hands. May I ask you please to convey to Ambassador Elaraby the deep sadness of my country at the terrible ordeal which has been suffered by Egypt in these last few days. Our thoughts at this time are with the Egyptian people.

At the outset of this Committee's work last year, New Zealand commented on the auspicious climate for making progress on disarmament. The auspices indeed proved favourable, not only here in New York but also in the wider world. Here we witnessed a reduction in the number of draft resolutions, and

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

the adoption by consensus of 60 per cent of those which did come before us. Last year's trend reflected a less contentious international atmosphere, and since we last met here together other major developments confirm that there is indeed a real change in the tide of disarmament and arms control. The new atmosphere results from the fundamental improvement in the security relationships and perceptions of the world's most powerful nations.

The progress has indeed been startling. Who, even last year, would have predicted the deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons agreed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 19 July? Who would have foreseen that an end to the testing of nuclear devices is within reach? Who would have been confident enough to look forward to consideration by this Committee of a draft Convention on chemical weapons? I shall refer briefly to these elements again, but I would like here to underline that this progress has, for the most part, been possible because of a structural change in international relations. That structural change contains the conditions for further progress.

But conscious effort will be required to take advantage of those conditions. Actual forward steps are the consequences of political will on the part of individual Governments or statesmen recognizing where their best interests lie. A decision of imagination and vision can give a tremendous boost to the confidence of nations, as well as to the expectations of people throughout the world. Presidents Bush and Yeltsin seized an opportunity at their meeting in Washington in July. President Mitterrand did the same thing when he announced his country's moratorium on nuclear testing in April. So did the authorities of the Governments involved when they agreed to the compromises necessary for this Committee to receive the text of a Convention on chemical weapons from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

With this favourable combination of circumstances and will, we can and we should anticipate good progress this year. The Convention on chemical weapons, which will be brought before this Committee and subsequently opened for signature in Paris next year, represents a remarkable achievement in the comprehensiveness of its provisions. Development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are dealt with in detail. So too is destruction. In its range and in the area of verification, the Convention will make an important contribution to accepted international practice in arms control.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

The negotiations on these issues were challenging, and we should like to congratulate all of those involved and to join with others in particularly congratulating Ambassador von Wagner of Germany for his able chairmanship and leadership in the Ad Hoc Committee, and also Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, whose determination and commitment earlier this year did so much to move the Committee's proceedings towards their final stages.

New Zealand is in good and abundant company among the 133 sponsors of the draft resolution on this item and will be offering strong support when it comes before us. In my delegation's view the Committee will do the treaty - and itself - less than justice if it does not unanimously approve the resolution submitting the Convention on chemical weapons.

New Zealand has a long-established commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Along with other States that share that commitment, we will once again be bringing to the Committee a draft resolution that promotes this objective. In our view the world now has a real opportunity to make a breakthrough on the nuclear-testing question. Clearly, the justifications for testing are less persuasive than ever. Public opinion, in the nuclear-weapon States as well as in the world at large, has recognized that. We do not accept that the safety and reliability considerations surrounding retained nuclear deterrents cannot be met by means other than testing.

The time is right to move forward. The decisions by Russia and France to adopt testing moratoriums have been complemented in the past two weeks by ground-breaking legislation in the United States. The United States legislation not only provides for a moratorium on testing but also looks

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

forward to a comprehensive, mutually agreed ban within the next few years. Those significant steps serve to confirm that the long-standing goal of eliminating all nuclear testing is within reach. The effects of such a historic development will be significant. Not only would a comprehensive test-ban treaty bring to a symbolic end the era of the nuclear-arms race, thereby powerfully signalling the world's abhorrence of these weapons of mass destruction, but it would also undercut the anxieties that exist that a double standard exists in regard to nuclear weapons, anxieties that have been the cause of political friction and strain in the context of promoting non-proliferation. In that respect alone it is clear that a nuclear test-ban would make an important contribution to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

For New Zealand there is no more important objective than strengthening that non-proliferation régime. The major focus of activity for the next three years will be preparing the ground for a productive and successful outcome to the extension conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. New Zealand will be working to ensure that the historic and favourable changes in the world strategic situation will be reflected in decisions that consolidate and further reinforce the importance of the Treaty. Securing an indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 will be an essential step in this regard.

The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that have committed themselves to the non-proliferation cause is among the issues on which advances should now be possible. Last month President Bush, addressing the General Assembly, proposed that the Security Council return to this issue in the future. The fact that all five acknowledged nuclear-weapon

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

States that make up the permanent membership of the Security Council are now within the NPT should greatly enhance prospects for progress in respect to both positive and negative security assurances.

The strengthening of the international safeguards system that underpins the non-proliferation régime should also be accorded priority. New Zealand therefore welcomed the confirmation by the States members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at last month's General Conference of their resolve to continue efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system.

In the Middle East we are still witnessing the dismantling, under United Nations auspices, of clandestine preparations made by a Party to the NPT to develop a nuclear-weapon capability. But the dangers of proliferation are not limited to the Middle East. It is no secret that the sense of confidence and stability of other regions of the world is undermined by fears of proliferation. Universal accession to the NPT and full and timely implementation of its obligations therefore remain of crucial importance.

A number of positive developments in the course of last year do lend cause for hope. We welcome the recent accessions to the NPT of China, France and South Africa, and the undertakings made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty in the near future. We also welcome the willingness of Ukraine, announced at the recent IAEA General Conference, to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards in the interim, until a formal safeguards agreement can be concluded. The fulfilment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA represents an important first step, and we welcome the cooperation of the North Korean authorities with the inspection teams so far.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

There is, however, still much to be done before the agreement is fully implemented, and, as was noted by many members of the IAEA Board of Governors at their meeting last month, the cause of transparency and mutual confidence-building on the Korean peninsula needs to be consolidated further through the agreements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in accordance with its earlier undertakings with the Republic of Korea, to mutual inspections.

New Zealand considers that nuclear-free zones established in accordance with the wishes of the countries of the region concerned can make an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation objectives. It is therefore gratifying that major countries of Latin America have now signalled their intention to take the final steps in the process of bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco and participating fully in its provisions.

As a South Pacific country, we set much store by the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone established by the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985. It is a substantial contribution, in our view, by our region to the principle of non-proliferation, and we commend it to the attention of all members of the Committee. In our view, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it merits the support of the nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, three have yet to accede to the relevant protocols, and this is a matter of great disappointment to South Pacific countries. We very much hope that in the new climate of increasing international confidence, qualified as it is by concern to reinforce the global non-proliferation régime, those States will be able to review their attitude and lend their support to our South Pacific Treaty.

But it is not only by institutionalized arrangements such as treaties or formal cooperative mechanisms, that security can be advanced on a regional

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

basis. The development of understanding and shared interests between countries in a particular region can be enhanced by dialogue, the exchange of views and the readiness to enter into confidence-building measures. Such activities contribute in no small measure to an increased sense of security and encourage countries within a geographical region to look at security problems in an open-minded and understanding way. New Zealand looks forward to progress in this whole area in the Asia-Pacific region of which we are part.

The attention which we rightly give to preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction must not blind us to the threat inherent in what we call conventional weapons. Many of them are far from conventional in the usual meaning of that word. They have been responsible for much death and destruction and diversion of wealth from the goal of a better life for the world's people.

New Zealand is not a large or powerful country, but historically we have sought to provide for our security, generally through collective-security arrangements that are sanctioned by the United Nations, and within our capacity we have strongly supported the United Nations in its peace-keeping efforts. It follows from this that we do not oppose the production and acquisition of arms for legitimate defensive purposes or for the sharing of international responsibilities for the maintenance of international order.

However, concentration of weapons or uncertainties brought about by arms transactions between States that are not sufficiently clear and open, or are not justified in terms of legitimate self-defence, lead to suspicion and instability. Sometimes they can be an underlying or proximate cause of hostilities.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

New Zealand therefore strongly believes in the principle of transparency in armaments and openness in dealing with arms transfers. New Zealand already declares its military spending to the United Nations and is ready to provide the information sought under the Register established at the last session of the General Assembly, in line with the guidelines agreed by the United Nations expert group. We look forward to the operation of the Register, its consolidation and its eventual expansion. It represents a most significant landmark, in New Zealand's view, on the way to building up mutual confidence and a greater sense of security.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

New Zealand welcomes the fact that this year, for the first time, we are holding a single general debate on both disarmament and international security. In our view, it is unrealistic to discuss disarmament and international security in isolation one from another. They are clearly two sides of the same coin. The more nations feel secure from threat, the more likely are they to limit arms purchases or embark upon the path of disarmament. In turn, as they take steps on the disarmament road, they will increase the sense of security of others and thereby increase their own. We attach great priority, therefore, to stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because we recognize the particular threat these weapons pose to international security. The intrinsic link between disarmament and international security is clear.

I began by referring to the improved relations and security perceptions of the world's most powerful nations. The sweeping changes in attitude which resulted have enabled progress to be made in many areas of concern to this Committee. However, this should in no way make us complacent. We endorse the comments made by Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria yesterday that it is important that the United Nations continue vigorously to pursue disarmament issues, since further progress on such issues remains vital to the achievement of international peace and security. We must particularly ensure that the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs remains equipped to carry out the important functions that we in this Committee mandate it to perform. We share completely the views Bulgaria and Canada expressed this morning on that point.

It is essential, too, that we seize the opportunities now available for making practical advances within the various multilateral forums that are charged with disarmament responsibilities. As other speakers have also noted,

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with the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention and, given the fundamental and irreversible changes for the better in the international climate, we need to take a close look at the adequacy of the current multilateral disarmament structures, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand looks forward to participating in a constructive dialogue on these matters.

In conclusion, we need to remember that it is not only the great and powerful that can change perceptions of each other. Smaller countries can contribute to a new sense of confidence and understanding, a sense of security on which to base practical achievements. Indeed, in an increasingly interdependent world freed from the rigidities and constraints of the cold war, it is absolutely essential that every country seek to develop positive relations with its neighbours if it wants to enhance its own security. This Committee can contribute directly by continuing to establish and reinforce the norms of international behaviour and by advancing concrete, practical disarmament measures designed to enhance international security as a whole.

Mr. MUHAMAD (Malaysia): The Malaysian delegation would like to join other delegations in offering our sympathy and condolences to Mr. Elaraby and the Egyptian delegation on the sad, indeed tragic, natural disaster which struck Cairo. The people and Government of Malaysia share the sorrow and the pain of suffering experienced by the people of Egypt owing to the great loss of life and destruction of property. My delegation wishes to extend, through Mr. Elaraby, to the Government and people of Egypt our deepest sympathy on this tragedy.

I am pleased to convey to Mr. Elaraby my warmest personal congratulations and also those of my delegation on his unanimous election as Chairman of this important Committee. He represents a country with which Malaysia has always

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

had warm and friendly relations. Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau.

Since 1945 the United Nations has provided a focal point for the international community in its efforts to promote the maintenance of international peace and security through cooperation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and disarmament. Through the years, the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament has progressively expanded. Indeed, the enormous threat to mankind of the development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is among the factors that have contributed towards the enhancement of the United Nations role in disarmament issues.

Since the end of the 1940s the question of disarmament has been dealt with mainly by the General Assembly, at its regular annual sessions and at three special sessions held respectively in 1978, 1982 and 1988, and also in numerous subsidiary bodies. Thus, while the Charter places parallel responsibilities on the Security Council and the General Assembly with regard to disarmament, in effect the General Assembly has come to play a leading role in this field.

The end of the cold war and other positive developments around the world have given grounds for hope in the field of disarmament and international security. However, there are still many challenges and obstacles along the path towards the achievement of global disarmament and international security. Though the world is still far away from complete disarmament, the global arms limitation and disarmament negotiations over the past decades have produced some tangible results.

During the past few years, we have witnessed a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament. These include the agreements reached on bilateral arms reduction between the

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United States and the Russian Federation last June in Washington, D.C. My delegation hopes that the implementation of the far-reaching reductions will be successfully carried out so that the process will advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. In this connection, we wish to call upon other nuclear-weapon States actively to participate in this endeavour and thereby rid the world of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

In our view, the attainment of long-term, durable peace and security must start with the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly with nuclear disarmament. Our goal remains complete nuclear disarmament. To begin with, my delegation believes that there should be a complete test ban on nuclear weapons and a reduction in nuclear arsenals. In this regard, we are happy to note that the President of the 1991 partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference conducted an informal consultation on 2 October 1992, to review developments in the international political environment relevant to the work of the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. At the same time, the informal consultation also gave an opportunity for delegations to exchange views on concrete steps to promote the achievement of the objectives of the Amendment Conference. Malaysia fully supports the proposal of the President to convene a special meeting in April 1993 to take stock of developments that have taken place on nuclear testing.

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

My delegation looks forward to participating in the open-ended consultations to consider the various proposals already submitted and those related to verification and the draft comprehensive test-ban treaty submitted by Sweden and others to the Conference on Disarmament. In this context my delegation would like to urge the nuclear-weapon States to support the ongoing efforts of the Amendment Conference on the partial test-ban Treaty with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against all non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation believes that the time is right for the international community to push for a complete cessation of nuclear testing by all States as a vital global objective to be pursued at various levels. In this regard, while we welcome the moratorium declared recently by certain nuclear-weapon States, such as France, the Russian Federation and the United States, we would like to urge all the nuclear-weapon States to turn the temporary moratorium into a permanent ban on testing. The shaping of the new international order to sustain a world free from all nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the right of every State to pursue its own path of development. These principles are essential for the establishment of a just, democratic, equitable and non-violent world order.

Malaysia would also like to see a general review during the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. We consider the Treaty as discriminatory in that it came about only after a few countries had gained the capacity and resources to develop,

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possess and retain their nuclear weapons. The Treaty also fails to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon States or to promote the concept of universality. We believe that the only way to achieve universality in the NPT is to eliminate totally all types of nuclear weapons and to transform the NPT into a convention banning the production, stockpiling and transfer of nuclear weapons. The world should take the opportunity to consider amending the NPT to transform it into an instrument for the elimination of proliferation while encouraging cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly by promoting environmentally safe methods of managing nuclear facilities.

For the past several decades there has been considerable support for the idea of establishing zones in various parts of the world in which military activity would be restricted. In particular, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is seen as a measure that would greatly assist in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons and that would promote nuclear disarmament.

Malaysia has long supported the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, including our own region in South-East Asia, so as to help create conditions conducive to peace and stability and to eliminate super-Power rivalry.

As I have said earlier, the United Nations has a unique role and primary responsibility in all issues of disarmament. In order to promote universal adherence it is important that all States be allowed to participate in multilateral efforts towards disarmament on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In addition, we wish to stress that bilateral negotiations cannot replace multilateral efforts in the disarmament field. Malaysia is also concerned over the growing restraint being placed on access to technology by

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the developed countries through the imposition of ad hoc export regimes under the pretext of non-proliferation regimes, since these may impede the economic and social development of developing countries. We wish to call for an effective means of tackling the problems of proliferation through multilaterally negotiated, universal and non-discriminatory disarmament agreements.

Turning to the subject of chemical weapons, Malaysia supports the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction and would like to urge others to sign and ratify the Convention, a result of many years of negotiations within the United Nations framework. We hope that the successful conclusion of the Convention would lead to a similar convention on weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons. However, we wish to highlight a few important issues in the Convention, one of which is verification, which should not be at the expense of national security, trade secrets and the smooth functioning of the chemical industries, and should be absolutely non-discriminatory. On economic and technological development, Malaysia fully supports the undertakings in the Convention to allow full economic and technological development within the chemical industry, to maintain international cooperation within the industry and to promote trade. Malaysia has also decided to co-sponsor the draft resolution on the chemical weapons Convention, which will be submitted to the Committee at this session.

The discussion on transparency in armaments received serious attention by the Committee at its session last year, at which Malaysia, along with a number of non-aligned countries, was a party to the negotiations that brought about broad support for General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, which includes provisions for the expansion of the Register to include the production and

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stockpiling of various armaments, including non-conventional weapons and their delivery systems. We believe that resolution 46/36 L has initiated a process that will eventually help to bring about transparency and confidence among nations. My delegation also supports the Secretary-General's report on the Register of Conventional Arms (A/47/342 and Corr.1).

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

The report provides detailed technical procedures for the effective operation of the Register and ways and means for the early expansion of its scope. Malaysia, through our expert, has played an active role in the United Nations panel of governmental technical experts on the Register of Conventional Arms at the three meetings held during the course of this year. We wish to call on all delegations to give due consideration to, and support, the report in order to help the United Nations continue its historic march in ensuring world peace and security in the future.

It is our view that the disarmament campaign and confidence-building measures deserve serious attention from and support by the international community. Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflicts between States. In this regard, we fully support the recommendations made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on preventive diplomacy in his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace". The report also calls for a closer relationship between the United Nations and regional associations, particularly where they can contribute in the process of regional confidence building. While the disarmament campaign promotes an awareness of the futility of war, confidence-building measures help to maintain peace and harmony. The exchange of information on military-related matters, treaties of amity and zones of peace should be used to achieve the objectives of disarmament and confidence-building measures.

As delegations are by now aware, the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with other countries in the region, intend to submit a draft resolution on regional confidence-building measures based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. The sponsors believe that the Treaty is an important instrument of regional confidence building which encourages regional cooperation and strengthens regional peace

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and stability. The aim of the draft resolution is to obtain United Nations endorsement of the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. We hope to count on many delegations' support of and co-sponsorship of this draft resolution.

Malaysia is proud to be a member of ASEAN, where we have managed to bring peace, stability, and economic and social development to our region through cooperation and consultation. A big portion of our national budget goes to the sector of economic and social development rather than to arms procurement or a greater build-up of armed forces than that considered necessary for self-defence. We believe that the build-up of military power undermines security rather than strengthening it.*

One cannot deny the close links between disarmament and development. Excessive military expenditure stifles economic growth and adversely affects the scope and content of international economic cooperation. On the other hand, disarmament contributes to economic and social development by deploying scarce resources for better use by mankind. Malaysia is a strong believer in this concept. The United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research has calculated that the world continues to spend nearly $2 million a minute on arms. Third-world countries cannot afford to join in the arms race. Thus, the resolution of regional disputes is essential for the creation of conditions enabling States to divert their resources from armaments to economic growth and development.

Taking the question of disarmament as a whole, though Malaysia welcomes bilateral and regional agreements, the United Nations should continue to take

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* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

the lead, given the global implications of the issue, especially on such weapons of mass destruction as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We are of the view that the continued upgrading of arms production and excessive sales by the big Powers will not contribute towards the lessening of tension and arms build-ups. It is only too obvious that, on their own, transparency and confidence-building measures, through such means as the United Nations Register on armaments and the submission of information on military budgets to the United Nations, would not be sufficient. Indeed, their objectives would be undercut if major arms exporters were not prepared also to prevent excessive arms sales abroad.

There is a genuine concern that, instead of striving to achieve the peace dividend following the end of the cold war and to convert huge military-industrial complexes in major arms-producing countries to the production of civilian goods, certain countries seem to be choosing an easy way out by using their influence to exploit unstable conditions in other parts of the world to market their arms exports aggressively . Though the cold war has ended, regional conflicts seem to be on the rise and are undermining the disarmament campaign. Hence, confidence-building measures must involve a certain degree of understanding to prevent an arms race and excessive build-up at both the regional and the international levels.

With the end of the cold war and the increasing interest in using the United Nations as a forum for building consensus on the maintenance of international peace and security, Malaysia hopes that the goal of achieving disarmament and promoting international security will be achieved in the near future. Although the Security Council has been mandated by all Member States with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter, we believe that in its broader sense this

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

this responsibility must be shared with the General Assembly. There should be not only open discussion within the Council but also greater consultations with the general membership of the United Nations, and their views should be respected in the spirit of Article 24 of the Charter.

Peace and development are indivisible. It is widely recognized that without economic development and prosperity we cannot hope to achieve lasting peace and stability. Efforts to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past. This will include addressing such problems as the growing disparity between rich and poor, barriers to trade, crushing debt problems, population growth, the environment, poverty, refugees and drug abuse, which are affecting the security and even the survival of States. Malaysia firmly believes that nations committed to social and economic development are less likely to go to war, which would only bring misery and destruction.

(Mr. Muhamad, Malaysia)

But many countries of the South need development assistance from the North and, more importantly, in the longer-term positive international economic environment, to develop their economies. In that regard we wish to call upon the international community to work towards promoting international cooperation to address the various economic and social issues I mentioned earlier, which would have an important bearing on the overall question of peace and security. Let us all now join in a common effort to promote such cooperation and rise to the challenges ahead.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Allow me first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your vast diplomatic experience and intimate knowledge of disarmament issues are true guarantees that your term as Chairman will also mean a successful session. I assure you of my delegation's cooperation in our joint venture.

I should also like to convey, through you, to the people and the Government of Egypt my country's deep sympathy with respect to the terrible disaster that occurred in your country a few days ago.

The issue I should like to address in my statement today is the prohibition of chemical weapons. This year, delegations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament were witness to a unique sequence of events. Never in the past had the Conference devoted more time to the negotiations on chemical weapons - in fact, this item overwhelmed the agenda of the multilateral negotiating body - and rightly so, given the goal in view. The prompt adoption of the negotiating mandate based on the resolution adopted by consensus at last year's session of the General Assembly signalled the determination of the negotiating parties. The mandate formulated the intention to achieve a final agreement on a Convention on chemical weapons

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

this year. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the guidance of its energetic and skilled chairman, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, embarked on its task with this ambitious objective.

Notwithstanding the participants' expressed will to negotiate, it was evident that the process would not be an easy one. In certain instances there was a feeling that negotiating positions were frozen, and progress turned out to be extremely difficult. Fortunately, the inventiveness of the negotiators, coupled with widespread readiness to compromise, repeatedly helped to overcome situations of quasi-stalemate.

In recollecting the events of the negotiations we cannot fail to mention the important and bold initiative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. Senator Evans submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a draft convention on chemical weapons, one which, besides attempting to formulate possible compromise solutions to all outstanding issues, provided a structure that served as a basis for the final framework of the Convention. In this way the presentation of such a draft also turned out to be a catalyst in the negotiations.

The end product of the incredibly intensive negotiating process was a document that also received a variety of criticism. This paradox was due to the differing degrees of dissatisfaction at some of the compromises reached in the course of bargaining. Some was voiced because of the insufficiency of certain solutions, while, according to other opinions, some of the final provisions went further than could be accommodated to national positions. In the end, despite expressed misgivings, supporting views prevailed, which showed that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had managed to strike the correct political balance in his final draft of the Convention on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

The document that figures as an appendix to the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament is a result long sought by the international community. We have at last a multilateral disarmament agreement that will totally banish the threat posed by chemical weapons in a universal, comprehensive and verifiable manner. In this regard, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction is an unprecedented international legal instrument among the numerous disarmament agreements concluded so far.

The long title itself reveals to a great extent the political and security objectives and intentions formulated in the Convention. It speaks about a truly comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Relevant provisions stipulate prohibitions on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. The scope of the definition of chemical weapons is wide enough to meet the needs of a credible ban, and credibility is enhanced by an elaborate system of verification. That includes the international verification of the destruction of declared stockpiles. Furthermore, the verification régime provides for a system of routine and challenge inspections, satisfying the dual requirement of building confidence and deterring potential violations. At the same time, the operation of this complex system of verification is envisaged in the least intrusive manner possible and attempts to observe legitimate economic and other national interests. Thus, we can say that the régime will undoubtedly contribute to the reliable enforcement of relevant provisions in the course of implementation. In addition, it may also serve as an example for future regimes of verification in arms control and disarmament agreements.

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

There are two other remarkable features of the Convention. First, any State party that falls victim to the use of chemical weapons or is threatened by such weapons can always count on the assistance and protection provided by other States parties, as set forth in the appropriate provisions. Secondly, the Convention, while committed to the promotion of international scientific and technological cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry, will attempt to contribute to non-proliferation efforts in a genuinely global manner.

Finally, I should like to touch upon the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to be established at The Hague. The triad of the future organization, namely, the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, shall all have specific functions in overseeing the implementation of the Convention. The Executive Council will act as the principal operative body in the course of implementation. The main elements of the compromise reached in the consultation group, over which I had the honour of presiding, with regard to the size, composition and decision-making of the executive organ will, it is hoped, ensure the effective functioning of this very important body, and, of course, one cannot dismiss the challenging tasks ahead of the Technical Secretariat, which will be performing all the inspections that will take place during the implementation of the Convention.

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

In this regard, the Preparatory Commission is likely to have a primordial role in getting the machinery started. Hungary is prepared to take part in this preparatory work in the fullest possible way.

The final phase of the negotiations on a global and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons was a great challenge and an exhilarating experience for all parties involved. The outcome of years of negotiations climaxing early this fall, the Convention on chemical weapons is an accomplishment underscoring the importance of multilateralism. It is heartening to note the endorsement displayed by the vast number of sponsors of the relevant draft resolution. It certainly shows the members of the Conference on Disarmament that they have done their job in a widely acceptable manner. The Convention is yet another proof of the possibility of seeking national security through collective action. The result was certainly worth the effort and we are proud of it.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.